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Abstract
The Egyptian uprising, which began on January 25, 2011, and ended on February 11, 2011, 
culminated in the ending of President Hosni Mubarak's 30-year reign as dictator. After free 
elections in which the Muslim Brotherhood ascended to power in the country, they were ousted 
in a military coup d'etat only one year after their ascension to power and were replaced by 
former military general Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi. The symptoms which led the country to rise up 
against Mubarak continue to exist under el-Sisi today, indicating that no revolution really took 
place. This paper answers the question, “why did the revolution fail?”, offering a rhetorical 
reason for the revolution's failure. The uprisings, which were billed as decentralized, offer 
unique opportunities for analysis of rhetorical strategy. This paper uses the reconstitutive- 
discourse model, a critical model which examines a rhetor's reconstitution of their audience's 
character, to examine the rhetoric of three different parties in the revolution. First, it examines 
the rhetoric of all protestors irrespective of source via Twitter and on the ground protestors; next 
it looks at the rhetoric of Wael Ghonim, who is credited with instigating the uprisings, and 
Mohammed ElBaradei, an influential figure who became interim vice-president in the aftermath 
of the uprisings. The study found that first, the uprisings were not really decentralized and indeed 
has leaders. Further, rhetorical failures on the part of its leaders caused the uprisings to fail in 
their goal of democratic revolution.
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“The essential, the identifying characteristic of democracy is that here the people rule.” - 
Frederick Antczak
Chapter 1: Introduction
Kramnick (1972) defines revolution as, “a flagrant and abrupt change in the fundamental 
conditions of legality, understood in this sense of giving legitimacy or acceptability” (p. 182). 
Further, he limns the analogous nature of political revolution to scientific revolution, defining the 
latter as occurring when:
. . .one paradigm is replaced with another, when a new highest-level conceptual scheme 
which governs all lower-level experimentation and theory replaces another. This does not 
occur through evolution. In terms of the old paradigm, the new appears absurd, unnatural, 
and impossible. It is a conception of the universe deemed illegal by the legitimizing 
canons of its immediate predecessor. The old and the new paradigm are utterly 
incompatible; the sudden change from one to another is the essence of scientific 
revolution.
Historically, revolutions have developed around a central figure or party. In Germany, it 
was Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party; in Russia, Lenin and the Bolsheviks; Che Guevara and the 
antiimperialist Cuban revolutionaries; or Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh. Each of these rhetors 
successfully reconstituted the identities of their audiences, upon whom they depended for 
meeting their political goals. Given this, the synchronicity between the goals of party and 
constituency has been paramount to the party's success.
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By contrast, the event known as the Arab Spring presents novel opportunities for 
rhetorical scholarship for two reasons: first, the Arab Spring is said to have been decentralized. 
Chalcraft (2012) explains that a decentralized movement refers to one instigated by multiple 
parties without a particular doctrine, where society is constructed deliberatively through 
consensus-based action. This contends with the established notion that a social movement relies 
on a leader with a focused vision for it to have a goal towards which to work (DeCaro, 2003). 
The next characteristic which renders the Arab Spring unique is that the uprisings are said to 
have been facilitated by social media (Al-Jenaibi, 2011; Scott, 2012; Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011; 
Iskander, 2011; Russell, 2011). The rhetoric of the revolution was shared online by its 
proponents, and the utilization of social media in reconstitutive discourse has never before been 
studied by rhetorical scholars.
1.1 Contextualizing the Arab Spring:
In the wake of the global decolonization which followed World War II, citizens of 
nations in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia Minor, and much of Africa and South America, 
which had newly gained their sovereignty, aspired to cement their national identities. 
Unfortunately, these newly-formed nations found themselves making necessary concessions 
involving the trading of social, political, and economic liberties for the promise of prosperity 
under government-centralized industries; and the regimes under which many of them found 
themselves were dictatorships. For many of these new sovereignties, the hope of democracy 
dwindled in the postwar period. As time went on, however, many of these post-colonial 
dictatorial regimes began to fail. Be it for reasons that were political, social, or economic in 
nature, or a mix of any of the three, their citizens once again aspired to the ideal of democracy, 
hoping that self-government would ameliorate the problems brought on them by dictatorships.
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Such hope for democracy blossomed in the Arab World in the final days of 2010 with a 
series of revolutions that became known as the Arab Spring. It began first in Tunisia; then in 
Egypt and Libya, until civil demonstrations occurred on some scale in a majority of countries 
spanning the Middle East and North Africa.
1.2 Contextualizing Egypt:
It is important to understand, however, that not every country which participated in the 
Arab Spring faced the same set of challenges, nor experienced the same outcome. Although there 
has been a tendency in popular media to discuss the events homogeneously, this is probably due 
to their geographic and temporal proximity, and the similar set of motivating factors which 
spurred the revolutions. However, it is important to study the context of each individual country 
in order to determine the specific challenges each faced during their own Arab Spring uprising, 
as well as to understand their outcomes (Anderson, 2011). Ozekin and Akkaş (2014) denote five 
variables which ultimately shape the outcome of the uprisings: government response; role of 
security forces; foreign intervention; ethnic and sectarian makeup of society; and politico- 
institutional characteristics of state structure
In Egypt, the uprisings were motivated by strong sociopolitical and socioeconomic issues 
which plagued multiple strata of Egyptian society. It was against the regime of President Hosni 
Mubarak that the Egyptian people revolted. Mubarak had assumed power in 1981 after the 
assassination of his predecessor, Anwar Sadat. Like much of the Middle East, a conservatively 
governed post-colonial Egypt operated under the auspices of what Faria and McAdam (2015) 
refer to as the Arab “Social Contract,” where autocracy was tolerated in the Arab world in return 
for economic stability and security as newly-independent states planned their growth. Despite 
initial periods of high growth and enhancing development in Egypt for a short time, however, 
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this system was inherently risk-averse and tended towards security and stability rather than 
investment in infrastructure. It also placed a large amount of economic control in the hands of 
the public sector, creating a system of patronage where basic necessities such as food, jobs, and 
public infrastructure were regulated by the state. In addition to this, practices hindering the 
competitiveness of the private sector by the state suppressed the sector's economic prowess 
(Amin, 2012). When an economic crisis loomed before a heavily indebted Egypt in the 1990's, 
Mubarak's government struck an economic reformation accord with the World Bank. According 
to Shehata (2011):
Over the next two decades, the Egyptian government under took a series of structural 
adjustments to the economy that reduced spending on social programs; liberalized trade, 
commodity prices, and interest rates; suspended the longtime guarantee of government 
employment for university graduates; privatized a number of public-sector companies; 
and suspended subsidies for many commodities. As state expenditures declined, public 
spending on social services—including education, health care, transportation, and 
housing—stagnated, and the quality of these services deteriorated. (p. 27)
While this system worked for those in political power as well as their limited clientele, it did 
little to deliver prosperity or social justice to the large majority of the Egyptian people (Malik & 
Awadallah, 2013). Egyptians who had depended on the state to provide them their basic 
necessities were now bereft.
Parallel to its socioeconomic problems were Egypt's sociopolitical problems. Many Arab 
countries, including Egypt, were ruled by authoritarian regimes under a flimsy guise of 
representative democracy. Freedom of assembly or expression were often curtailed, and the 
widespread waves of democracy which had made their way into Latin America, Eastern Europe, 
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and Eastern and Central Asia had barely made a ripple on Arab shores (UNDP, 2002). The 
actions of the police force went largely unchecked; the police often used torture and brutality as a 
means of extracting information from suspects. It was also used as a way of curbing 
demonstrations and protests (The Guardian, 2011). An overall feeling of repression, and a lack of 
personal safety and dignity permeated all but the topmost strata of Egyptian society (Al-Abed 
Al-Haq & Hussein, 2012). Corruption and injustice weighed down the Egyptian people, 
particularly the youth, who were keen on participating in a more democratic form of governance.
Thus, when Khaled Said, an Egyptian blogger, had been beaten to death by two police 
officers because of an incriminating video he had possessed and intended to upload online 
showing the officers divvying up cash and narcotics which had been seized during a drug bust 
(Bradley, 2010), the condition of the state finally pushed Egyptians across the threshold from 
compliance into dissidence. Critically, the death of Said had come on the cusp of the Tunisian 
revolution. Egyptians, heartened by Tunisia's successful deposing of Zine el-Abidine bin Ali, 
were awakened to the possibility of reassuming popular control of their government, and the 
death of Said had given them the cause behind which they would rally (Saikal, 2011; Anderson, 
2011) .
1.3 A Democratic Ideology
The demonstrations in Egypt were manifestations of calls for a democratic system of 
governance voiced by its citizens (Saikal, 2011). Democratization theory, which describes the 
conditions under which society turns to democracy as a viable political solution to current 
problems, explains this phenomenon. Inglehart and Welzel's modernization theory of 
democratization (2009) establishes that:
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Modernization is a syndrome of social changes linked to industrialization. Once set in 
motion, it tends to penetrate all aspects of life, bringing occupational specialization, 
urbanization, rising educational levels, rising life expectancy, and rapid economic 
growth. These create a self-reinforcing process that transforms social life and political 
institutions, bringing rising mass participation in politics and -in the long run—making 
the establishment of democratic political institutions increasingly likely. Today, we have 
a clearer idea than ever before of why and how this process of democratization happens.
According to this theory, which inextricably links modernization and the eventual establishment 
of a democracy, Egypt was ripe for democratic revolution. The Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region had begun to enjoy longer life expectancies (World Bank, 2016), and had placed 
strong emphasis on education beginning in the 1960's (World Bank, 2014). Further, in 2010, 
43.0% of Egypt's population lived in urban areas (Central Agency for Public Mobilization and 
Statistics, 2018). Pre-revolutionary Egypt seemed to meet many of the criteria laid out in the 
modernization theory of democratization: the working-age youth in Egypt were plentiful, and 
they were educated, but critically, they were also unemployed (World Bank, 2009). Rising life 
expectancy and education levels, as well as mass urbanization, were critical components of 
Egyptian society preceding the revolution. A younger and more well-educated Egypt had led to 
greater political awareness and proclivity for political discussion by its citizens (Kuhn, 2012; 
UNDP, 2010).
Sarihan (2012) uses Huntington's (1991, 1993) theory of third wave democratization to more 
specifically contextualize Egyptian democratization. Huntington's theory holds that between 
1974 and 1990 there occurred a third wave of democratization which resulted in 30 countries 
establishing themselves as democracies. The chief characteristics of the third wave are that, 
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unlike first and second wave democratization, countries experience internal pressure towards 
democratization, usually resulting from opposition groups. The other chief characteristic is that 
the political systems which are turned democratic should be military regimes, personal 
dictatorships, one party systems, or a combination of these. He argues that the movement 
towards democratization can occur either by reformists establishing a democracy or by 
collapsing the current autocratic regime.
While this theory endeavors to explain the process of democratization, as well as the 
conditions which tend to create a push for democratization, it neither defines what a democracy 
is, nor does it guarantee that the changing system precipitates a democracy. Indeed, in his 
analysis of the Arab Spring, Sarihan (2012) concedes that neither was he able to conclusively 
place the Arab Spring within the third wave of democratization, nor would participation within 
the third wave of democratization necessarily lead to the establishment of a truly democratic 
regime. In fact, the situation against which he warns in his conclusion, the allowance of a 
military takeover of the government, transpired exactly in this way in Egypt. One year in the 
wake of the revolution, the military organized a coup after the election of the Muslim 
Brotherhood to the presidency under the auspices of a new constitution. They jailed the leaders 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, outlawed the party, and assumed control of the government, placing 
former military general Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi in power.
1.4 Present-Day Egypt:
Sisi's ascension to the presidency has seen many of the factors which led the Egyptian 
people to the point of revolution continue to exist within the country under the post-revolutionary 
regime. On August 14, 2013, the military committed what has come to be known as the Rabaa 
massacre, in which at least 817 people protesting Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi's ascension to the 
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presidency were killed by the military. In addition to this, there is documentation of various other 
killings committed by the Egyptian military (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Police brutality is still 
rampant in the country, with protestors and dissidents still being held indefinitely and, in many 
cases, tortured without charges being brought against them (El Sirgany, 2016). Poverty has 
continued to climb in Egypt (UNICEF, 2017), and unemployment numbers have also increased 
in the post-Mubarak period, with 2017 being the first year these figures have seen a decline 
rather than an increase since the revolution (World Bank, 2018).
Thus, given Kramnick's (1972) definition of revolution, it is clear that no revolution 
really took place in Egypt. This paper offers a rhetorical answer to the question, “why did the 
Egyptian revolution fail?”. Answering this question will involve examining why Egypt was 
unable to have a truly democratic revolution, who was responsible for implementing the ideology 
that governed the protestors, and whether or not that ideology took root.
8
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Despite overwhelming interest in studying the Arab Spring, few academics have analyzed 
the actual discourse exchanged during the uprisings. Van Dijk (1993) defines critical discourse 
as involving:
. . .that we presuppose a serious analysis of the very conditions and modalities of 
inequality, e.g. in terms of social power, dominance, and their reproduction. In a critical 
study, such an analysis is not limited to a sociological or political-scientific account of 
dominance or patterns of access to social resources. Rather, positions and perspectives 
need to be chosen. . .Such choices influence virtually all levels of theory and method.
According to van Dijk, critical discourse analysis can be done in many ways using a variety of 
methods. However, the chief characteristic of critical discourse analysis involves a thorough 
analysis of the strata of social power within a society and the dominance and inequality which 
results from the positions and perspectives on each stratum.
Alaimo's (2015) work, which conducts a content analysis of the discourse between Wael 
Ghonim, the creator and original administrator of the “We Are Khaled Said” Facebook group, 
and the group's followers, touts the revolution as a success for the Egyptian people's successful 
deposing of President Hosni Mubarak. However, no mention is made with regards to the 
aftermath of the Arab Spring; further, the resulting Egyptian political, social, and economic 
infrastructure is not taken into account in the author's analysis. Critically, however, Alaimo 
credits Ghonim for triggering the revolution in Egypt. Her study analyzes the posts made by 
Ghonim and 100 of each post's earliest commenters in order to ascertain the role played by the 
Facebook group in “catalyzing and sustaining” (p.5) the protests. According to the author, the 
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findings demonstrate that substantive discourse was issued by Ghonim, mainly including his 
“softening” of his followers to the idea of participating in civil protests, further educating them 
on the specific grievances brought on the Egyptian people by the Mubarak regime, and positing 
ideas for the reconstitution of the country's government. Alaimo concludes that social media can 
be used as a platform for meaningful discussion. However, this work constitutes a content 
analysis of the discourse, and the author employs no specific critical rhetorical methodologies in 
their analysis.
Al Masaeed (2013) conducts a critical discourse analysis of the slogans of the revolution. 
He concluded that Egyptians had adapted language into powerful slogans which had served to 
challenge the status quo, and by doing so had successfully challenged an oppressive regime. 
Once again, however, the scope of his paper is extremely limited, and the conclusions presented 
are limited and vague. Although a critical methodology was implemented to analyze the 
revolutionary rhetoric of the Egyptian uprising, the sample size collected, composed of only four 
examples of revolutionary slogans, was too small for any definitive conclusion to have been 
made.
Eltantawy & Wiest (2011) utilize resource mobilization theory, a social mobilization 
theory, to further lend credence to the notion of the internet as logistical tool. In their work they 
discuss the internet as a resource for disseminating information amongst the revolutionaries. 
Resource mobilization theory holds that the use of a resource depends on its availability as well 
as the means to use it. By the time of the Egyptian revolution, Egypt had been experiencing one 
of the highest rates of internet usage per capita in the world. Realizing that the internet could be 
used to facilitate the revolution would have been innately logical to Egyptian revolutionaries, 
who had only just seen its usefulness in aiding the revolution of their Tunisian neighbors.
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Critically, this also means that within the messages sent amongst each other, Egyptian 
revolutionaries found the motivation to go out into the streets and begin their revolution. Unlike 
most examples of revolutionary rhetoric, this means that face-to-face communication was not the 
preliminary nor primary means of facilitating the revolution. Although there are scholars who 
would argue over the extent of the role played by the internet, it is impossible to make claims 
about whether or not the revolution would have happened without it. The fact is that the internet 
was used as a means of facilitating the revolution.
Other works further cite the logistical role played by the internet. Lotan et al. (2011) 
conduct an analysis of Twitter, which not only includes the communication exchanges between 
revolutionaries, but tracks the flow of news and other information during the revolution. They 
note that different group types interacting with one another tended to generate more or less 
audience interaction on Twitter (in the form of retweets). For example, they note that interactions 
between journalists and activists generated the most prominent reactions from Twitter audiences, 
indicating that interested parties included those who would be affected by the events of the 
revolution, mainstream media trying to keep viewers up-to-date with current events, and general 
readers who wished to know about events as they happen. While their study looks at audience 
reactions to specific interactions, it does not qualitatively examine the conversations being had 
on Twitter, and thus makes no analysis of them. It does not examine how audiences were 
affected by the information shared with them on Twitter, only that they indicated interest in it.
While the literature has an apparent tendency to examine the function of the internet as a 
logistical tool, at least in context of the Arab Spring, Aouragh & Alexander (2011) discuss the 
critical difference between the internet as a space and as a tool. They explain the internet as a 
“space...in which it is possible to articulate an intellectual challenge to dominant ideas about the 
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social and political order”. They note that online platforms, particularly social media, functioned 
as “spheres of dissidence” which allowed for the formation of opinions, and then as a logistical 
tool for establishing places or times for future meetings or protests. What is singularly absent is 
any note about the nature or subject of the opinions formed: were people swayed to protest in 
order to oust the Mubarak regime or in order to establish Egypt as a democracy? Like analyses of 
Egyptian democratization, critical details concerning the content of the rhetoric of the revolution 
seem to be missing from their analysis.
2.1 Theoretical Framework
There has been a limited amount of critical discourse analyses conducted by rhetorical 
scholars with regards to the Egyptian Arab Spring uprising. In contrast to its magnitude in 
affecting the political infrastructure of the country, this indicates that there is an opportunity for 
more thorough analysis to be conducted on the discourse exchanged during the events of the 
uprising. This paper uses Hammerback and Jensen's (2003) reconstitutive-discourse model to 
offer a rhetorical explanation for the failure of the revolution. Reconstitutive discourse theory 
traces its roots to theories of rhetorical criticism which hold that “the clearest access to 
persuasion (and hence to ideology) is through the discourse used to produce it. . .ideology in 
practice is a political language, preserved in rhetorical documents, with the capacity to dictate 
decision and control public belief and behavior” (McGee, 1980). Solomon (1988) adds that there 
exists:
A relationship between specific ideologies and their inherent rhetoric. Clearly, one's 
ideology constrains the arguments one uses and colors the presentation of those 
arguments. Some ideologies are also inherently more attractive to particular audiences 
and, thus, present fewer rhetorical problems for their advocates (p. 184).
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In the simplest terms, reconstitutive rhetoric occurs when a rhetor attempts to redefine their 
audience into a “new person.” As such, it requires the rhetor to employ specific rhetorical means 
to meet this goal (Hammerback, 2001).
The reconstitutive-discourse model is a critical model for analyzing the dissemination of 
an ideology from a rhetor to an audience. The model operationalizes not just persuasion towards, 
but the very enactment of an ideology, through its discourse. It achieves this by dividing a 
rhetoric into three elements for critique: the first persona, or how an audience perceives the 
rhetor; the second persona, or how a rhetor personifies the audience in their message; and thirdly, 
the substantive message itself, comprising of goals, implicit or explicit behavioral cues, 
evidences, and validations for the audience.
The operationalized reconstitutive-discourse model was built on Antczak's (1985) claim 
that an audience's identification with a rhetor imbues that rhetor with authority over their 
audience. Antczak writes:
Americans identified with, granted authority to those like them; in the full capabilities 
and virtues his discipline gave him, an Emerson or Twain or James could be 
representative of them - like them, only more so. The audience, by being drawn to his 
character, was drawn to the thought that clearly helped make him. The reconstitutive 
power of this rhetoric lay in the identification of thought and character.
The rhetor's success lies in their ability to merge both thought and character, such that their 
audience's identification with the rhetor draws them to that rhetor's thoughts. The identity of the 
rhetor conveyed to the audience by the rhetor constitutes the first step in reconstitutive discourse, 
known as the first persona. Antczak's rhetorical interpretation of the first persona expands on the 
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ideas of literary critic Wayne Booth that the character of an author exists entirely within the text 
and can be fabricated by the author. It draws strongly on the ethos of the rhetor and is 
exemplified most directly by direct comparison. First persona rhetoric is exemplified, for 
instance, in a politician running for election in a mining town citing that they also “used to work 
in the mines.” The first persona can take into account either textual or non-textual sources, such 
as the rhetor's actions, family history, and ethos. Further, while the author has a means of 
formulating their character for their audience, there are, crucially, elements they cannot control. 
For example, the author cannot control their audiences' subconscious precepts. That 
notwithstanding, the key to a rhetor's success lies in the rhetor's ability to convey a persona with 
which an audience not only identifies, but who represents the utmost in those characteristics such 
that the audience aspires towards the thoughts (ideologies) which made the rhetor.
In the next step of successful reconstitutive discourse, the second persona mirrors the first 
persona in that it refers to the implied auditor, or implied audience, of a text, rather than the 
implied author. Hammerback and Jensen (2003) draw on the work of Edwin Black (1970), who 
states that the second persona is a version of the author's audience that the author creates. It may 
be communicated to the audience by the rhetor either explicitly, in the form of being given a 
directive; or implicitly, by citing personality traits necessary for the movement to reach its goal. 
The second persona reinforces the reconstitutive power of a rhetoric and clarifies for the 
audience the actions they must take in order to most completely identify with a rhetor and their 
message, and thus more wholly become the idealized person with whom they are identifying. For 
instance, in his (1994) analysis of the fascist rhetoric of Jose Antonio, Hammerback 
demonstrates the utilization of both first and second persona by the rhetor in Antonio's creation 
of a necessity for specific characteristics in a Spanish leader (second persona), and then the 
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fulfillment of those characteristics within himself (first persona). The strategic brilliance of this 
move is made evident in the understanding that Antonio's call for a leader with specific 
characteristics makes him the intended auditor of his own rhetoric, while also drawing the 
attention of the Spanish public to his fulfillment of these expectations for a leader.
Both the first persona and the second persona are communicated to the audience via a 
substantive message which incorporates “themes, arguments, explanations, and evidence” 
(Hammerback & Jensen, 2003) into the author's work. This augments the personas cast onto the 
audience by the author; it may also articulate the objectives of a movement. The author may 
propound ideas, behaviors, and goals necessary for the success of a movement and claim that 
they themselves embody them, or convey that they embody them through behaviors, 
mannerisms, language, and appearance. Referring to Antczak (1985), if an audience identifies 
with a rhetor, they are also inclined to identify with the rhetor's message. By doing this, the 
rhetor creates an argument in which their audience attempts to realize in themselves the character 
they believe the rhetor to be. The substantive message is crucial in the reinforcement and 
validation of the character presented to the audience to embody, affording them the tools they 
need in order to successfully embody and defend the personas.
Multiple rhetorical scholars have utilized the reconstitutive discourse model to assess the 
effects of reconstitutive rhetoric on an audience. It is critical to note, however, that only 
centralized, interpersonal examples of reconstitutive discourse have ever been recorded by 
scholars. Two particular hallmarks of the Egyptian uprising differentiate it from past revolutions: 
according to Chalcraft (2012), the Egyptian uprising was decentralized in nature, which in this 
case refers to a movement instigated by multiple parties without a particular doctrine, where 
society is constructed deliberatively through consensus-based action. The other feature which 
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distinguishes it from other mass uprisings is the proliferation of its rhetoric online (Al-Jenaibi, 
2011; Scott, 2012; Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011; Iskander, 2011; Russell, 2011). This provides new 
opportunities for ascertaining whether or not reconstitutive discourse can occur outside of 
currently-recorded contexts. In Hammerback and Jensen's (2003) work on the rhetorical career 
of Cesar Chavez, Chavez “aimed for nothing else than the rhetorical reconstitution of listeners 
and readers who would then act out their new definitions by working with him to reach his 
goals” (p. 44). Understanding that the goals set by a rhetor in their discourse is paramount to the 
success of the movement cannot be understated in studies of reconstitutive rhetoric. Without 
goals towards which to work, the purpose of a rhetoric is completely changed from 
operationalizability to something else entirely. This point has been understated in current studies 
of reconstitutive discourse, but is perhaps its most important facet, providing an end for the 
rhetoric. Chavez, who was faced with the task of organizing and unionizing American farm 
workers, utilized a strong rhetorically reconstitutive approach in order to meet his goal. He 
wished to turn a group of individual farmers and supporters into “a vibrant movement capable of 
defeating entrenched agricultural interests in and beyond California” (p. 62).
DeCaro (2003) furthers the theory, drawing upon an important facet of reconstitutive 
discourse: cultural distinctions and comprehension. In his work, Rhetoric of Revolt: Ho Chi 
Minh's Discourse for Revolution, he describes the importance of Vietnamese nationalism as well 
as cultural heritage to the success of Ho Chi Minh's rhetoric during Vietnamese independence. 
Further, he notes that the Western inability to understand this nationalist movement in Far East 
Asia ensured that the constituency of the revolution would not be swayed by external pressures 
(p. 51).
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McGee (1980) provides a useful means of understanding these notions of cultural 
distinction by understanding the political audience. McGee discusses “ideographs,” or political 
slogans which hold a specific meaning to the particular society within which they exist. There 
are two critical points he brings up in his work: first, that these ideographs hold real meaning for 
the people who enact them. On this, he says:
The important fact about ideographs is that they exist in real discourse, functioning 
clearly and evidently as agents of political consciousness. They are not invented by 
observers; they come to be as a part of the real lives of the people whose motives they 
articulate. (p. 7)
McGee stresses that ideologies hold sway over not only those who are the subjects of political 
expressions of power, but over those who enact those expressions as well. In the Egyptian 
revolutionary scenario, this translates to their own belief in the ideologies expressed in their 
rhetoric, as well as their desire to persuade other Egyptians to those beliefs. In addition, he 
stresses the lack of “pure” definitions for ideographs, positing instead that their meanings are 
constantly changing, derived from their specific applications over time. On putting forth an 
applicable definition for an ideograph, he argues that:
. . .we are forced to make reference to its history by detailing the situations for which the 
word has been an appropriate description. Then, by comparisons over time, we establish 
an analog for the proposed present usage of the term. Earlier usages become precedent, 
touchstones for judging the propriety of the ideograph in a current circumstance (p. 10).
Extrapolating his words to the Egyptian revolutionary context, this alleges that any political 
slogan or rhetorical device used for persuasion during the revolution is a concept understood 
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from previous applications of that concept. Thus, Egyptian calls for “democracy” must come 
from their collective understanding of democracy. It would be reasonable to assume, given the 
high rates of Egyptians on the internet, and the state of globalization, that the majority of 
Egyptians were tantalized by western governments, primarily the United States, which they 
viewed as truly democratic, or at least far more democratic than their own.
Thus, if the Egyptian revolution was indeed decentralized, then is the reconstitutive 
discourse method applicable? It is precisely to this question that this paper intends to contribute 
an answer. Historically, identities of audiences have been precipitated by rhetors who acted as 
catalysts. By studying the rhetoric of the Egyptian revolution, this paper conducts the first 
examination of whether or not an audience can reconstitute itself from within. And so, by 
utilizing the reconstitutive discourse model, and examining all relevant extant Egyptian 
revolutionary rhetoric from the Arab Spring, I hope to offer a rhetorical explanation for the 
results of the 2011 Egyptian uprising.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
When examining the reconstitutive discourse from a decentralized standpoint, the 
rhetoric must first be divided into that of the revolution and that of the regime. “Rhetoric” for the 
purposes of this study is defined as any actionable or ideological political language. This paper 
focuses only on the rhetoric of Egyptian revolutionaries between the dates of January 25, 2011 to 
February 11, 2011 via two platforms: the decentralized, organized masses, whose rhetoric exists 
online on Twitter and Facebook (Al-Jenaibi, 2011; Scott, 2012; Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011; 
Iskander, 2011; Russell, 2011) and the slogans chanted in mass protests on the street (Al-Abed 
Al-Haq & Hussein, 2012; Al Masaeed, 2013). The constituency of this group is viewed as 
anyone participating via either of these media. Revolutionary discourse on Twitter is assessed by 
taking a sample of the fifteen latest posts every 6 hours containing the “#jan25” hashtag. This 
was the most popular hashtag used during the days of the uprising (Wilson & Dunn, 2011). The 
sort order of a post is determined by Twitter's “Latest” posts function, which organizes posts 
chronologically in descending order from latest to earliest. Further, search filters are used to 
isolate the timeframe of a tweet. The slogans are those found in extant academic works, as well 
as those available through textual and visual/audio documentation of the protests. However, a 
limitation of studying such a broadly segmented group limits the specificity of the analysis. 
Despite the revolutionaries collectively striving to instill a new paradigm, the nature of the 
paradigm to be instilled differs depending on the specific ideologies of each individual 
revolutionary.
Classically, however, those who espoused the revolution and are considered its leaders 
are also studied. Alaimo (2015) and Howard and Hussain (2011) stress the significance of the 
part played by Wael Ghonim in the uprising. They claim that Ghonim, who was the creator and 
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original administrator of the “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook page is responsible for 
triggering the revolution. Alaimo's contention that the substantive nature of Ghonim's discourse 
in disseminating ideological as well as inspirational rhetoric warrants the study of said discourse. 
Ghonim's Facebook posts from his “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook page are assessed; 
however, because several of the posts he made were deleted, some of the deleted posts are taken 
from his book, Revolution 2.0: The power of the people is greater than the people in power: A 
memoir (2012). The data collected is from those posts which were generated between January 
25, 2011, and February 11, 2011.
The third and final party whose rhetoric is studied is Mohammed ElBaradei, the 2005 
Nobel Peace-Prize winner who served as interim vice-president of Egypt after the ouster of 
Hosni Mubarak. ElBaradei boasted enormous popularity amongst many Egyptian citizens. He 
had previously served as chief of the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency and 
had been a proponent for a more democratic Egypt since at least 2004 (Iskander, 2011). 
ElBaradei had begun reaching out to Egyptian youth to inspire hope for a change in the Egyptian 
political system in 2009, gradually becoming more of an antagonist towards the Mubarak 
regime. In 2010 he established the National Movement for Change, a collective of intellectuals 
and politicians that called for democracy in Egypt (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011). Although 
ElBaradei is heavily active on social media, he either did not contribute much online content 
during the revolution, which seems unlikely, especially given that he was not actually in Egypt at 
the time of the revolution; or his content was deleted following the ouster of Mubarak. Given 
this, any extant textual or audio/visual content of ElBaradei's referring to the 2011 uprising is 
analyzed. This includes primary sources such as remaining Tweets; as well as secondary sources 
such as newspaper articles.
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The reconstitutive-discourse model is used to examine each of a rhetor's body of rhetoric 
for cohesiveness in the portrayal of a persona embodying a specific ideology for their audience 
to adopt. The success of the rhetoric assessed in this paper is measured by the adherence of a 
body of rhetoric by a rhetor/party to a specific ideology, as well as the adoption of that ideology 
by the rhetor's audience.
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Chapter 4: Results and Analysis
4.1 Decentralized Groups
No significant data was collected with regards to this group utilizing the definition of 
rhetoric and the data collection method specified in this paper. The collected data shows that 
most of the messaging espoused by this group was composed of relayed logistical information 
for the protestors, messages of support for the uprising, and political conjecture in the form of 
speculating the outcome of the uprising (see Appendix A). Further, it appears that the two-step 
flow of information phenomenon developed by Katz & Lazarsfeld (1955) is evidenced here in 
the utilization of Twitter as a medium for social communication, as influencers begin to emerge 
from whom the brunt of the Twitter populace receives their information (Lotan et.al., 2011). 
During live protests, the slogans chanted by the protestors called for the ouster of the regime and 
included such phrases as “the people demand the overthrow of the regime!” or “The people and 
the army are one hand!” (Srage, 2014). Interestingly, an examination of the slogans changed by 
the decentralized masses seems to demonstrate a merger of first persona and second persona. The 
protestors embodied characteristics they believed represented the revolution in the form of 
political slogans, such as calls for democracy, and imposed those characteristics on their fellow 
protestors.
Examining the slogan, “the people demand the application of God's law!” (Srage, 2014) 
however, reveals another interesting facet of a so-called “decentralized” body of protestors. 
Although all apparent slogans chanted by the protestors denote a total enactment of anti-regime 
ideology, this particular slogan was chanted only by conservative Islamists. This denotes a 
difference in the ideology being applied between smaller subdivisions of protestors, and further 
corroborates the notion that the rhetoric espoused among the revolutionaries was not aimed at the 
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establishment of a democracy. This seems to affirm DeCaro's (2003) notion that a revolution 
must have a strong leader from whom the revolutionary ideology is espoused and embodied. 
Future study should examine whether these revolutionary leaders may emerge “internally” from 
an uprising as its constituency begins to embody its ideology. For instance, could a movement 
precipitate a leader who might not necessarily be the progenitor of the movement?
A “decentralized” revolution is one from which no leaders emerge and where the 
constituency is self-governed through consensus and deliberative policymaking. This was not the 
case in Egypt, where leaders such as Wael Ghonim (Alaimo, 2015; Howard & Hussain, 2011) 
and Mohamed ElBaradei emerged as leaders of the movement. This facilitates further room for 
inquiry into whether or not an uprising can be defined as decentralized or whether leaders always 
emerge to guide their audiences towards particular ideologies.
4.2 Wael Ghonim
The rhetoric contributed to the events of the uprising by Wael Ghonim is indisputably 
critical to the way the uprising transpired. Ghonim, triggered the uprising with the creation of his 
“We Are All Khaled Said” page on Facebook (Alaimo, 2015; Howard & Hussain, 2011). He 
launched an effective social media campaign with extensive reach into the demographic to which 
his rhetoric appealed. Ghonim's rhetoric is laden with first persona characteristics. “I wanted to 
ask every one of you what you wish for, because I'm sure our problems are different even if their 
causes are one. . .I am tired of feeling that my vote does not matter” (Ghonim, 2012, p. 150). 
Ghonim establishes his political grievances, whether they are similar to that of his audience or 
not, because the actual subject matter of the grievance is irrelevant. What is important here is the 
shared establishment of grievances all emanating from the same source. Once again, his 
messaging utilizes the probable ubiquity of experience to breed empathy within his audience. In 
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another example, Ghonim claims that, “I don't want to go to a ballot center and be told by a 
laughing thug, ‘It's okay—we have already voted on your behalf'” (Ghonim, 2012, p. 150). 
Further examples of implicit utilization of the first persona by Ghonim include his choice to 
write his posts in an Egyptian dialect rather than using formal Arabic, which is the standard for 
written communication in that language (Alaimo, 2015). The use of Egyptian Arabic as a means 
of establishing empathy echo DeCaro's (2003) idea that reconstitutive discourse is affected by a 
cultural dimension. This is due to the strong nationalistic and cultural associations between 
people who share specific Arabic dialects. Ghonim's ability to parley with his audience in a 
dialect personal to them creates paralinguistic (what Hammerback calls ‘implicit') first-persona 
characteristics of identification, wherein he establishes unspoken facets of his character 
recognizable to his audience. Use of formal Arabic would have conveyed an air of politicization 
or glibness to his posts; his use of the Egyptian dialect rather than formal Arabic reduces the 
social distance between him and his followers across all strata.
His discourse also utilizes substantial conveyance of second persona characteristics. For 
instance, he says “We must reach out to the helpless layman who only cares about finding his 
loaf of bread. . .Let's refrain from elitist sophisticated talk so we don't end up only 1,000 or 
2,000 on the street. . .” (Ghonim, 2012, p. 141). Drawing on the powerful parallel of the 
Tunisians who had just ousted their own president, Ghonim establishes that elitism in the form of 
sophisticated political ideology divides the protestors along class lines. It is unclear as to whether 
or not Ghonim was aware of the level of socioeconomic stratification of his audience, however, 
his rhetoric flattens these layers, calling for his audience to enact one specific trait: humility. 
Ghonim's audience, which was substantial in size, grew to 1.2 million followers of his Facebook 
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page at the end of the uprising (Howard & Hussain, 2011), and had successfully adopted 
Ghonim's idea of a peaceful uprising rather than one of violence.
Thus, there is strong evidence to support the idea that Ghonim was successful in 
reconstituting the character of his audience. His use of reconstitutive rhetoric embodied within 
himself the suffering of his fellow Egyptians, and his reasoning for establishing a peaceful 
protest was successfully adopted by his audience, to whom he stressed the importance of the 
characteristics of empathy and humility. However, his messaging also contains further evidence 
of the limited extent to which his messaging facilitated reconstituting the character of his 
audience towards a democratic ideology. His messaging frequently calls for his audience to 
“demand their rights” (Ghonim, 2012) from the regime. This seems to conflate with other 
messages that he has disseminated which call for the ouster of the current regime. This conflation 
is symptomatic of the underlying problems within Ghonim's rhetoric: its apparent lack of a clear 
goal.
4.3 Mohammed ElBaradei
Mohammed ElBaradei, who assumed the interim vice-presidency in the vacuum left by 
Mubarak's ouster, was extremely popular in Egypt. He is mentioned by name in much of the data 
reviewed online as the clear candidate to lead the country by a large, specific subset of 
Egyptians. Currently, his Twitter page boasts slightly over 6.1 million followers. Strangely, 
ElBaradei's Twitter account shows no activity between January 27, 2011, and February 9, 2011. 
Since it is unlikely that he would have not participated in an uprising he had been calling for 
since at least 2004, and the seemingly perfect platform in which he could have conveyed his 
rhetoric for Egyptian democracy, it seems as though the content from that period was deleted by 
ElBaradei himself, someone with access to his account, or by Twitter. This forced me to examine 
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other the data available which documents his rhetorical activity, which consisted of the 
remaining posts on Twitter from January 25, 2011 to January 26, 2011 until February 10, 2011 
onwards. Any extant data which could be found which referred to ElBaradei's political ideology 
was analyzed in order to determine his rhetorical strategies during the Egyptian uprising.
What is immediately striking is that ElBaradei, in contrast to Wael Ghonim, writes in 
formal Arabic. Where Ghonim was concerned with marshaling supporters to protest Mubarak's 
government, ElBaradei writes about steps Egypt must take in order to transition from Mubarak's 
government to a new system entirely. For instance, in one of his Tweets (see Appendix B), he 
discusses the need for a new constitution over holding temporary elections. His use of formal 
Arabic indicates eloquence, a character trait ElBaradei, who ran in the presidential elections held 
later that year, intends to convey as an implicit quality of leadership. In other Tweets, ElBaradei 
cites random provisions from Egypt's current constitution, for which his rhetoric also calls for 
the abolishment. Critically, this creates a conflict in ElBaradei's messaging. Further, he seems to 
take a more passive stance with his messaging, forming it as directives to the regime which call 
for specific rights for the Egyptian people. ElBaradei is in fact making his audience the recipients 
of his messaging since they are directly receiving his Tweets, however, he structures the 
messages with the regime in mind.
ElBaradei's rhetoric heavily conveys the need for a more democratic system of 
governance. In multiple speeches given during the events of the revolution, ElBaradei once again 
addresses the need for a more democratic constitution (AlMasry Alyoum, 2013; PBS NewsHour, 
2012). However, in the speech, he fails to mention who is drafting the constitution, as well as 
how it would represent the totality of Egyptian people. In an interview with CNN (2011), 
ElBaradei calls for a “new Egypt” but again, fails to specify what his goals for what this would
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look like. During the uprisings, ElBaradei delivers a speech to a crowd of protestors where he 
claims that “today, we are all different Egyptians” (Ecadforum, 2011). It appears that the rhetoric 
espoused by ElBaradei attempts to instill the idea of a change in paradigm in the protestors, 
attempting to convert the momentum from the protests into the larger goal of establishing a 
democracy. Although not heavily laden with identification, ElBaradei's rhetoric attempts to 
substantiate that a democracy ameliorates the problems brought on by Mubarak's dictatorship.
However, ElBaradei seems to also within the system currently in place and change it 
piecemeal from within. When Egypt held elections in 2012 after Mubarak's ouster, ElBaradei 
withdrew from the race, contending that the country was still being run by the previous regime, 
indicating that military generals had been running the country (Lee, 2012). Further, he cited that 
the Egyptian youth would suffer if no alternative means of implementing a government would be 
put forth (The Telegraph, 2011). In the aftermath of these events, ElBaradei says that he will 
only run under the conditions of “a real democratic system,” (Lee, 2012). This seems to conflate 
with ElBaradei's earlier role as a leader who was calling for his audience to uphold the ideals of 
democracy. This version of ElBaradei seems to call for someone else to establish democracy 
within the country. This conflation leaves confusion in the wake of ElBaradei's rhetoric, making 
his goals unclear.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
No democratic identity as defined by the protestors can be ascertained to have been 
rhetorically reconstituted by any of the three parties examined in this paper. It seems as though 
the Egyptian political identity cultivated during the uprisings was aimed at ousting the current 
regime, more than it sought to re-establish itself as a democracy. At the very least, no steps seem 
to have been taken towards establishing a democratic system beyond the ouster of the regime. In 
fact, this is the very idea which led Mohammed ElBaradei to withdraw his candidacy for the 
presidency during the post-uprising elections. The irony is that it was ElBaradei himself who 
called for the establishment of a democracy but did not convey the means by which to do so 
beyond vague calls for a democratic constitution. Wael Ghonim is guilty of the same rhetorical 
folly. An analysis of their rhetoric seems to expand on Solomon's (1988) idea that ideologic 
rhetoric must offer a mechanism for change, adding to it that the mechanism must include a 
means by which this mechanism can be put into action. A good example to illustrate this idea 
looks at the elections which took place within Egypt after the uprising ended, in which the 
Muslim Brotherhood won the vote and assumed power. According to Trager (2016), the 
Brotherhood benefitted from being a tightly organized, hierarchical group with a deeply 
committed membership. In contrast, ElBaradei, whose rhetoric espoused a democratic ideology, 
had in fact failed to follow through with an outline similar to that of the Muslim Brotherhood of 
how this was to be accomplished. No details are given with regards to the democratic 
constitution he desires, especially with regard to what it would provide the Egyptian people, nor 
who would be drafting it. This denotes that the ideology which governs the country is not one 
which was imposed on it by the regime of Hosni Mubarak but goes further beyond that. Further, 
the differentiation between the rhetorical strategies pursued by both Ghonim and ElBaradei, led 
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them to utilize different messages to convey to their audiences. This, as well as the different 
platforms used by each rhetor may have segmented their audience such that rhetorical 
reconstitution towards any specific goal would have been inefficient. Because of the cultural 
dimensions involved with successful revolution noted by DeCaro (2003) and those involved with 
political ideology noted by McGee (1980), any Egyptian seeking democracy must embody the 
ideals they define as part of that ideology and reconstitute the identity of the Egyptian towards 
that ideology. The particulars associated with how this is to be accomplished should be noted as 
part of the reconstitutive process and is beyond the scope of this paper to determine.
However, what Kramnick's (1972) definition of revolution makes clear is that revolutions 
cannot be counted as successes or failures. There is revolution, or there is no revolution. The 
paradigm shift necessary for Egypt to have executed a successful revolution would have been the 
implementation of a system which ameliorated the symptoms of the dictatorship they blamed for 
the state of the country at the time of the uprisings. Those symptoms were self-described by 
Egyptians. Again, McGee (1980) posits that ideographs (politico-linguistic expressions of an 
ideology) are defined by the people who embody them. By the Egyptian peoples' definitions, 
democracy is incompatible with dictatorship. Given this, and in light of Kramnick's contention 
that a successful revolution entails a new paradigm whose very nature makes so that it cannot 
exist within the old paradigm, there was no revolution, but in fact a maintenance of the status 
quo. Despite Ghonim's apparent success in conveying an ideology for his audience to embody, 
as well as ElBaradei's discourse which argued for a specifically democratic ideology, they failed 
in reconstituting the character of their audiences into one which would embody the ideals of their 
self-defined democracy; or at least any other political ideology which would render the Egyptian 
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paradigm of dictatorship impossible to exist. If democracy was indeed the goal of their rhetoric, 
then it is a goal that was not achieved by it.
However, it is not to say that there are aspects of the Egyptian uprising which were not 
successful. I would not argue that the ouster of Mubarak was not successful: it is self-evident that 
this is not the case. In terms of democratization theory, this at least brought the Egyptian people 
closer to the ideal of democracy. The fate of Egypt and its citizens lies in the ability of its 
citizens wishing change to cohesively adopt a paradigm which ameliorates the problems that 
stirred the uprising in the first place. Whether this can be done via a decentralized, consensus­
based revolution is yet to be seen. History teaches us otherwise: that revolutions have 
predominantly centered around a leader. What is clear is that the rhetorical means by which 
Egypt attempted to alter the current paradigm have clearly not worked in accomplishing its 
democratic goal.
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Appendix A
Samples of Tweets by protestors:
Mona Eltahawy @monaeltahawy ■ 24Jan 2011
RT @Wa7damasrya #Egyptians in #Paris are doing a demonstration torrorrow 
#Jan25 at 5 PM at Saint Michel
Amnesty International @amnestyusa ■ 24 Jan 2011
#Jan25 demonstrations to mark new direction for #Egypt? http://ow.ly/3JowE
Mona Eltahawy @monaeltahawy ■ 24 Jan 2011 
Youth r solution, not problem:Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Morocco all must b liberated. 
EIGENERAL FEAT MR SHOOMA_ http://on.fb.me/enEHjB #Jan25
Mona Eltahawy @monaeItahawy ■ 24 Jan 2011 
Dedicated to #Egypt w love. Fight The Power #NYC style http://bit.ly/bWbLS4 and
#Tunisia style http://on.fb.me/enEHjB #Jan25
Wael Ghonim @Ghonim ■ 24Jan 2011 
Despite all the warnings I got from my relative and friends, I'll be there on #Jan25 
protests, Anyone goingto be in Gam'et Dewal protest?
Waleed @RunWaleedRun∙24 Jan 2011 
I wouldn't be surprised if the internet or facebook goes down in Egypt tomorrow 
#Jan25
Mona Mahfouz @monamahfouz ■ 24 Jan 2011
Cynical used-2-disappointments me has nothing 2 say bout #Jan25.Hope 4 the 
best,so who knows,maybe in 5 yr Egypt becomes an option 2 Iive in
Asa Winstanley @AsaWinstanley ■ 24 Jan 2011
All eyes on #Egypt tomorrow. http://bit.ly/hXYB3C #jan25 #intifada
Mahmoud Salem @Sandmonkey ■ 24 Jan 2011 
So, I guess I am gonna be going tomorrow. Gonna Park the car in Zamalek. Safest 
place in town. #Jan25
Jack Shenker @hackneylad ∙24 Jan 2011
Mubarak regime braced for nationwide protests in 'day of revolution' - The
Guardian http://bit.ly/hXYB3C #jan25
Jack Shenker @hackneylad ■ 24 Jan 2011
benwedeman @bencnn ∙25Jan 2011
Madness in #Cairo, Restraint thrown to the wind, Complete crackdown on all 
protesters, Blasts from multiple directions, #Jan25 #Egypt
Wael Ghonim @Ghonim ∙ 25 Jan 2011 
Now in Tahrir situation is cut of control, Prevented 2 angry guys from throwing a 
huge metal on police cars from top Of the bridge! #Jan25
Jacob Appelbaum @ioerτor 25 Jan 2011
What other sites do people need tested in Egypt? @january25 =Egypt #jan25
Shadi Hamid @shadihamid 25 Jan 2011
Good roundup from @nickbaumann on today's protests in #Egypt 
http://bit.ly/hgL0zX #jan25 
benwedeman @bencnn ∙25 Jan 2011
Exchange heard In Cairo tonight: What do you think Pres. Mubarak is thinking 
tonight? Reply: He's probably on tranquilizers." #Jan25 #Egypt
Gigi Ibrahim @Gsquare86 ■ 25 Jan 2011 
Tahrir got broken up by poIice using tear gas, rubber bullets, water hoses, & rock- 
throwing..ppl r still marching in DT #Jan25..I'm home 
benwedema @bencnn ∙ 25 Jan 2011
Cairo echoing with blasts, ambulance sirens. Tear gas wafting down comiche 
toward tv bldg. panicked drivers going wrong way, #Jan25
Shadi Hamid @shadihamid ■ 25 Jan 2011 
On #Egypt US should consider Creative initiatives, such as a 'reform endowment' 
which I discuss here http://bit.ly/eiVL5O #Jan25
Shadi Hamid @shadihamid 25 Jan 2011
US, at very least, needs to start distancing itself from Mubarak, by Stepping up 
public criticism of repression #Egypt #jan25
Alshaheed @AIshaheeed ■ 25Jan 2011
Special thnx 2 US govemment 4 supporting our corrupt dictator supplying him 
With tear gas to attack us. US pubic is supporting us. #Jan25
Ayman Mohyeldin @AymanM ■ 31 Jan 2011
#aje crew was released & will be covering million man rally 2mrw #feb1 #Egypt 
=jan25 (via phone)
Travel - State Dept @TraveIGov ■ 31 Jan 2011
#Egypt: We have safely evacuated over 1,200 U.S citizens from #Cairo at this 
time. #Jan25
Mona Eltahawy @monaeltahawy ■ 31 Jan 2011
Message to #Mubarak: you've shut down practically all there is to shut down in 
#Egypt but you can't shut down the will For freedom. #Jan25
Octavia Nasr @octavianasr ■ 31 Jan 2011
The Muslim Brotherhood explained on @npr's 'TheTakeaway' by @shadihamid 
http://bit.ly/i0pMTg #Jan25 #Egypt
Brian Conley @BaghdadBrian ■ 31 Jan 2011
Do you Speak engllsh and arabic fluently? want to help translate voices from 
#egypt? @ or DM me #jan25 #pharaoh @speak2tweet
Bill Gross @Bill_Gross ■ 31 Jan 2011
Internet down in #Egypt. No problem, Google, Twitter. SayNow have a way you 
can call a number & do voice-to-tweet.http://is.gd/DCjC9S #Jan25
Danny Sullivan @dannysullivan ■ 31 Jan 2011
very cool from google& twitter way for egyptiars to tweet by phone, Voicemail 
turned Into tweets http://bit.ly/e4A5jS #jan25
Noah Shachtman @NoahShachtman ■ 31 Jan 2011 
Mubarak's Going to Saudi Arabia, CIA-Funded Forecasters Say 
http://wrd.tw/hMWYNq #jan25 #egypt
Jan25 Voices @Jan25voices ■ 31 Jan 2011 
Doubly confirmed: Egyptian TV showing pictures of Pro Mubarak demonstrators 
at TV building. #Tahrir #Jan25
Mathew Ingram @mathewi ■ 31 Jan 2011 
CNN says that Egypt's Information Ministry plans to take cel networks offline now 
as well: http://is.gd/y8xUn7 #egypt #jan25
Iyse doucet @bbclysedoucet ■ 8 Feb 2011
Ran into 2 old Friends, veteran Mideast Correspondents, tonite, Both said this is 
the biggest story they've covered #egypt #jan25
Al Abed @ahmedinho1 ■ 8 Feb 2011
Israel bombing #Gaza now with F16s to ease the pressure on #Mubarak and 
divert attention from #Tahrir, many dead RT #jan25 #Egypt
Nevine @NevineZaki ■ 8 Feb 2011
Is the white house bipolar? #jan25 #Egypt
Shadi Hamid  @shadhamid 8 Feb 2011
My new piece For the NY Times on US policy & the illusion oF stability in Egypt 
http://nyti.ms/h6uTfj #jan25 #Egypt
Democracy Now! @democracynow ■ 8 Feb 2011
The heroes are in the street," says jailed ©google exec & #Facebook admin 
@Ghonim of #Egypt protests. http://ow.ly/3SyDE #jan25
@Sarahcarr ■ 8 Feb 2011
A Ietter received by our agony aunt http://bit.ly/hv9Z7W #jan25
Ahmed Alfl @AOAIfi ■ 8 Feb 2011 ,
Government working on a new plan to cancel Fndays instead Of internet #Egypt 
#jan25 #Tahrir
Mona Eltahawy  @monaeltahawy ■ 8 Feb 2011
RT @ShereefAbbas Epic pic RT @jzeelaG: Wael Ghonim holding Khaled Said's 
mother http://twitpic.com/3xsvbq #Jan25 #Egypt
Zelnobia QZeinobia ■ 8 Feb 2011 
Live ammunition was used T cracking down the protests at New Valley protests 
spread #Jan25 
 @3arabawy ■ 8 Feb 2011
New post: #Jan25 Protesters attack police Stations in several provinces 
http://bit.ly/eT6B2G
Dalia Ziada @daliaziada ■ 10 Feb 2011
Protesters are on their way to #Mubarak’s Palace! They are very close now! 
#Egypt #Jan25
@3arabawy∙10 Feb 2011 
Omar Suleiman's speech really reminds me of the 1960s govt rhetoric, The entire 
junta belongs to another obsolete century. #jan25
Naseem Tarawnah @tarawnah 10 Feb 2011
#mubarak might be in denial but US just as worse 4 thinking it stilI has a say in 
#egypt events, The youth have taken over, bitches, #jan25
Egyptocracy @Egyptocracy ■ 10 Feb 2011
CNN: Reports of 1000s of protesters marching to the wel guarded Presidential
Palace. #Egypt #jan25 #Tahrir #Mubarak
EmmaDaly · @EmmaDaly ■ 10 Feb 2011 
@HRW #Mubarak's speech didn't break with abusive system of 30 years. US and 
EU should use aid to foster reform #jan25 http://bit.ly/gKeAcL
Foreign Policy @ForeignPolicy 10 Feb 2011
RT @joshrogin White House silent after Mubarak shocker http://bit.ly/igzjal 
#Jan25 #Egypt
Wael G. Voussef @WaeIGuirguis ■ 10 Feb 2011
In a revolution, as in a novel, the most difficult part to invent is the end." Alexis 
deTocqueville #jan25 #tahrir #egypt
Alshaheed @AIshaheeed ■ 10 Feb 2011 ,
Protesters marching to Presidential Palace are saying they have NO intention to 
be violent at all. It's peaceful #Jan25 #Egypt
Reem AbdeIIatif - @Reem_Abdelatif ■ 10 Feb 2011 
Protesters at army HQ in #AIexandria http://goo.gl/acctl chant "Are you 
protecting the people or the dog [mubarak]" #egypt #tahrir #jan25
slate @SIate 10 Feb 2011 
Hosni Mubarak has dug in his heels. What's next for Egypt? A coup? A revolution? 
A crackdown? http://slate.me/he3Ukk #Egypt #Jan25
Wael Ghonim · @Ghonim ■ 11 Feb 2011 
Soon the ugly face of the regime wilΙ be supported by documents and evidences. 
#Jan25
Jim Sciutto @jmsciutto ■ 11 Feb 2011
It's 2am in Tahrir. #Egypt, do you know where your children are? Here. =Jan25
Tarek Fatah · @TarekFatah ■ 11 Feb 2011 
Here is a question no one is asking: Will #Mubarak stil dye his hair jet black now 
that he has had his face blackened? #Egypt #Jan25
John King @JohnKingCNN ■ 11 Feb 2011
Egypt ambassador to US tells @JohnKingUSA no idea if#mubarak will leave 
sharm el sheikh, no Contact with US govt re assets. #jan25 #egypt
Samar D Jarrah @SamarDJarrah ■ 11 Feb 2011
The illegal Mahmoud Abbas regime should be toppled in 18 hours! #jan25 
#palestine #Abbas
Amnesty UK @AmnestyUK ■ 11 Feb 2011
Got to Iove this photo message: http://fbit.ly/fPnk0Y #egypt #jan25 #tahrir 
#feb12global
Elazul @Elazul ■ 11 Feb 2011
Apparently tomorrow is the day of Rage in Algeria . They have my support. GO
ALGERIA! #Freedom #Algeria #Freedom #Jan25 #FuckYeah
BoingBoing @BoingBoing - 11 Feb 2011 
YouTube showcasing "citizen videos" of Egypt on day of Mubarak's ouster #Jan25 
#egypt http://bit.Iy/fsLDmt
AIyaa Gad, MD @AlyaaGad ■ 11 Feb 2011
Swiss freeze Mubarak family bank accounts #Egypt #Jan25 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f5c8422e-3631-11e0-9b3b- 
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1DhE5rUVz
Jeff Jarvis  @jeffjarvis ■ 11 Feb 2011
NPR: let's send him RT @acarvin: I must go toTunisia and Egypt. I must go to 
Tunisia and Egypt, I must go toTunisia and Egypt #jan25
Appendix B
Samples of Tweets from Mohammed ElBaradei:
٧ 2011 EIBarade". 23 Jan ٠ Mohamed EIBaradei
7ه٦د ماقت اكإذب٢ش نع هيتش ناوخا ٩._ط:لاا_ ئعخ'أ' ف؛دك خ؛بنك ىوخا غبطول 
خلادء ىلع لاذ■:يسا ااآ;خ:■ ليسلأا ض ماظنلا ىعلسلا نع لص ريبغنلا
Mohamed EIBaradeI > جد araee" . 19Jan 2011
ل Iy SLppor ca I 4 peacefL den'onstratons '√s. represson & CCJPtor. 'Λ'hen 
0„' derandsforc"arς⅛ fa or deaf earswhat opdcrs re∩'a n?
٧ 2011 EIBa rade" -19 Jan® ٠ Mohamed EIBarad ei
دبؤآ ةوقب ةوعد ∣]l,lφ.u مططغتطا عىلسلا ذشالح ذض عمقلا و .داعس] ^دنع لا ذنج نذا 
ةيغاص .".∣JL÷JH ام هى شاذب طاما ؟
Mohmed EIBaiadeS جد ٠  Baradei ISJan 2ΰ11
Ths wrfng ■ق on thewal, Hcpe Γeg"rτege⅛s it: Changi Cannotwait
٧ 2011 EIBa rade". 18 Jan® ٠ Mohamed EIBarad ei
ىنه مهفي متاخئل .زأ ريبغنلا اد-تذح ربغو للال لكصتلل ؟؟؟
Mohamed EIBaradeI 3 جد ا arace". ISJan 20'1
V c eree in Tjnsa no⅛⅛ is a proc<ict Cfcecaces Of repressorg'me "" Eg٦;pf 
must Undersfardfhat peacef“ change's arl⅛' way OUt
٧ 2011 EIBa rade". 15 Jan® ٠ Mohamed EIBarad ei
*فقتلا فى سون نلاا ئدبا هبس ةروت بئسا افمو وظ دز ض لىء.ععقلل تماخخا نا مهغب 
نا :ييفتلا ىلمسا ةلبسولاوه ةذحول بنجنل ام لاظلح هابقع
Mohamed EIBarad ei ٠ EIBa rade". 15 Jan 2011 ٧
The courage Ofthe Tunisian people tc upheld their freedom & dignity is a shining 
'ght a^d a tra' b a≡er. Ihange 0" y comes from w'thiπ.
٧ 2011 EIBa rade" -15 Jan® ٠ Mohamed EIBarad ei
مسا لك يرأته ءيلعا .م.با سلون بلع هتعاجش لأاذرتساو هقوقك ةبولسملا ن■: ةيرح 
٩لك\ح.ما \ذضذخ هخدغنس يا \ذذذ' سون \ء'دد. لأرس.
Molhanied ElBaradei ٠ :≡ Ba ace . - - eo ٢: - - 
⅛⅛'pt Toda؛.'؛ af'ee Sid prc,d '≡i'.Gcd Oless
٧ '201 SEIEaradei . '' Fab. ٠ Mohamed ElBaradei
تتع مؤرا ةرح. ا_ ث I ا بت بحن رتت
---٢" = .--: MohamedEIBaradei JSEBa aca
Pecp∖epc,..⅛v ■■؟ &Q1Λ ⅛⅛M I⅜¾w1⅜t·;٦■;ل .'"_ر٠أ'بباآ٦ ب۴١أ٢١.د .٢١ι٦-·--٢١٥٦ΐ ⅛⅛=
"SΞ'^oi ؛'1'11 hcpe arm؛ .Ξ I ρr⅛''Ξ I∣≡ ؛٠',', be Cruahed ؛ c≡n
٧ ''20 SEIEarade' . ' * Fab ٠ Mohamed EIEaradei
رزلت jb أق .∣L∣l∣k .بعشلا رعلاا رااذ رض ∣τ 'كب اذزغح ا دلص أز ذؤن ذلئاعع-ذ ةلتعل 
Iiu Γ ئ I .دخ ذععل دتنو قحل قوع .نؤشلا -
MDhamed ElBaradei O SE Ea ace ٠-; :≡c ;:" 
⅛'D[ ,','Il exp Dda A∏T∣⅛' TIjStaaca tha ;c-nl^' n:,'.
Molhamed ElBaradei * gE Earade' - OFab 20" V 
~ I زج —١ ;1 Lاوغل ج ات د .رتي دعح ب جلا— ىلع ثحا
٧ "2.0 SEIEaradei . 'OFab ه MDhamed EIEaradei
-∣⅛ غغححا نع .بثك ,—ذت √.;7∣J',. .ءا رك نرتي ىنحا قوغ ةوع JanS*
2Ξ" :؛ه -;٠ 'SiIEaiaae *٠ MDhamed EIEaradei
^:a\'^i:. لآ؛١۴١ا;؛ه٦ة\⅛v '.'؛؛ ٢١ًلا٦-..عة١-د. -⅛≡ لأ, ... ⅛∖⅛ ;∖\ am ⅛e
Molhamed ElBaradei * SE Earadei . 2⅛ Jan 2011 V
CUI ة٢لآئ٦٦ ⅛au ج■■٦اأ٦ئ\ات٣٧ثمب ؟ةةم.ةجد ١لح ⅛∖-. أ ٢لا٦ ةألآلآة٠.١ة ح٦٠_أ٦أ»٠٢١ئم ٦٠٦١':.؛؛
5⅛Uie ι'⅛ta⅛⅛eta .. ™خ ¾S,B \■■”م\لآ ة Iieeiuwi
٧ 2011 SEEarade' . 2⅛ Jan ٠ Mohamed EIEaradei
اؤس سع ذلاءي ادي ىع I رظاط ىعلط .L ادا-, ص g ثإتتإ__ذ.طا د ___ ن ل I ذ٠.ا. I قح نتت 
-_ ٦- |^-
2011 SE Ba aae . 26Jaπ ٠ MDhamed EIEaradei 
ه٦ج٢٢ذا ٢٢١حآح 1.1'1؛⅛-⅝'^ هوي .'-ض
Mohawal EIBaradei ٠ ?EIEaradei. ' 7 Feb 2.3' ' ٧
- زؤنس كعوع - ب— اذ. ىد ىلادعا خدذاذ - خؤكد ذك_ت خدو : ايت ىد  
ىس ذعلسمل . I ف٢٦اذ __ لاقتنلاا
√ ' '2.3 EIEaradei. ' 7 Feb? ه Mohawal EIBaradei
كزع. ΓI غراخط j -.- ري ك١غب_اوك .ئتك Jl S⅛⅛J '' ■■,- ._حوصكل قك نع .أ 
—تزو تنب ىبوخ .اث_ااست■ رتبج-ا ١— ؛ - :ق كس ئكجع
.٧ ''23 E Earadei. ' 7 Feb? ٠ Mohawed ElBaradei
parkh"ia Ξg^.-pti≡ne؛oui''.’.erethe’:؛٥lut'cn^nrpai'e (h'≡asa I CUt' 're 
re^ ؛11! □ا g ة enbraced't and i,rπed 't'ntc
Fe------,.---' حأكجكمر_ ><Hramedtxtaratoi 
ere are UC re⅛ ٦ FtouF Free mec ;٠٦١■ a؛ح„ Xrqerr-. rd ForX"depanderΛ 
.؟eXeiTr
MohaniedEIBaradei ؛?EEarace ■■■:؛كد■■ 
Fol d;al detai'ees ehc-ld be re eased immediade,
Mohamed ElBaradei ٠ ?EIEaradei . ' 7 Feb 23' * ٧
Wed Fratordca patXc ٠٠٠■ ح Q٠\d OtX.: aerreFX". ٩arir:٦-i arFt” ؟؛ و '-Fee ⅛. ⅛rups - 
cuF:;*ue . Wteen ^re^rerertFa⅛ie SiXopfded eXedcn
- - '،"- ٠آآة - - Etaraae'? ٠ ⅛FWotamed EFtarad
0' are آ ear irane:؛- Pepeal Cf eme'genc:. Ie, rght io eerals ish pareiee. cne
rr⅛∖⅛٠ لآ-ة epresenoa-...⅛ Fres, :.-.يآ;■' preτequ
MDhamiedEIBaradei ,?EEarace ■■:؛ة:;■■
=rc'.ie'onal Consiitic. Qresidemial Counel ةذ arm؛' ⅛ c' ' ens nafoiial UII Ύ 
gc'..emme": i"disQenseole for sπτ∣CQth irans'ticn.
Molhamed EIEaradei ٠ ?EEarade' '7Feb 2-3" ٧
FratoieuvraX pedcc ι⅛.. -.0 ∖⅛∙.. ٢ةي'.'؛غ'تح -٢ذ'.٢خ  opaque errd rro^.' r|'i\;: \e. XEometrr 
teκr∖u⅛D" Xete ' لآ derat ad. r.. UeetotoTaFi OI-..
Mohamed EIEaradei ٠ ?EIEaradei. 14 Feb 2.3'' ٧
حك ربؤكملل ن مشئاع تحاص 2 ح; زهظل نسقوتب اك تر  LΓ∣∣∣Γ خح _, ر ] __ حبظ
MoIhamedEIBaradei »?EEarace .'J:ec2E"
⅛. ⅛eXrre",.X-^,..X⅛t'atXrr r,aeor ةجآ'ة،\٦  .'ta⅛eret2.ttpm
beFW . iedaraE O iedaraEIE demahcM "لآ √
كااه على لئططق1 عرن. ذان: ج بأذى غ:تح والنظام سفط ||_. i ا_ع I
١ب 1102 bsE ifI . SadaraBIE: ٠ iedaraBIE deinahoM
taL.dsliared ab ٦٠n dluahS ة ras C latsyrc ers ^ratS hsar S rof sd"amed Ξ.Ξ pssP
tsap -eht f∣⊂ srsdn، b eht taeper tcn SU
iedaraBlE demahoM ه ?-bsE ifI - iedaraBIE 1102 ٧
 L يغ٠ولئوص. شئ-ئل-تغ I إ<تحخ1 حت.٠.ميص ضحت jI اب ذءا-_٠ ءئل|لسعأن. لشعب
الماغى. حطاء -تزى _i 1∣,7.⅝لا الوطن.. بناء سادة ⅛-l⅛ نقى
"02 bsF""- iadaraBIE& ٠ iedarsBIE demahoM
 rednu ara dna ',^tnu٥٠c eht gnivaeI ∣rnorf dennab eseht fo lsiI gnitiareS snaiipygE
laitnesse Ξicnersosnar" .noitagitsevni
iedaraBlE demahoM ٠ &bsE 71 . SadaraBIE 1102 ٧
 استذاب للنحفط؟ ∣,-∣,l∣.⅛J ∣r∣∣Λ∣^ι∣j عن المحنوعبى لنابق الطام غول فائحة س٠
ععلو^!
 1132bsE71- edaraBIE?. IiedaraBIE demahDM
 ق٠اخ.1 إغتلن" اتى لشر]رة1 كانوا لتباب شفط. ضاب 'وذة lL عى اتوذة دخنزال ذبحب
عحتخ. -||- الى وبتؤلوغ! اخضوظا المصرين جصه ع٠لئ3
iedaraBlE demahoM ٠ ?bsE 71 . iedaraBIE 1102 ٧
حزة. اخابات :⅛⅛ ل وعنفا؛ حز .!عدد دون حنفا؛: م تلت Γ نحتك دب حناك
 iedaraBlE demahoM ٠ ?:V 1102 bsF 71 . iedaraBIE
السباسسن. المعنقلن عن -توذ؛ الاغراج ..جب
٧ 1102 beF 71 . iedaraBIE)?- I iedaraBlE demahoM
 منكون تعرجنى واحالآ نيتى ك —والعحموتا .بأحراد ■حسو] كبح. ل_ا فعبرة ،تغاب فرن■
العات ا-ت راى لدكتكص عمت غبر ،تخابان
iedaraBlE demahoM ٠ ?bsF 71- iedaraBIE 1102 ٧
 عنعلباذ عن =كلها عام لعك؛ اكفاس عترن ÷ الآدب كوبى دربة - -ذاء٠ااءؤاا غانون الغاة.
المعتب'. -نموى لكاعة ∣⅜ι~∙'Γ~∣ بهتخز حرة ؛:ندبان
